In this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity of a wirelesly powered communication system comprised of an energy transmitter (ET), an energy harvesting user (EHU), and a passive eavesdropper (EVE). The ET transmits radiofrequency energy that is used for powering the EHU as well as for generating interference at the EVE. The EHU uses the energy harvested from the ET to transmit confidential messages back to the ET. Both the ET and the EHU operate in the full-duplex (FD) mode. As a result, both the EHU and the ET are subjected to self-interference, which has different effects at the two nodes. In particular, the self-interference impairs the decoding of the received message at the ET, whilst it serves as an additional energy source at the EHU. For this system model, we derive an upper and a lower bound on the secrecy capacity. For the lower bound, we propose a simple achievability scheme. Our numerical results show significant improvements in terms of achievable secrecy rate when the proposed communication scheme is employed compared to its half-duplex counterpart.
communication networks (WPCNs), is the full-duplex (FD) mode of operation. The FD mode of operation can lead to doubling (or even tripling, see [8] ) of the spectral efficiency of the network in question.
Motivated by these advances in FD communication and the applicability of physical layer security to WPCNs, in this paper, we investigate the secrecy capacity of a FD wirelessly powered communication system, comprised of an energy transmitter (ET) and an energy harvesting user (EHU) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (EVE). In this system, the ET sends radio-frequency (RF) energy to the EHU, whereas, the EHU harvests this energy and uses it to transmit confidential information back to the ET. The signal transmitted by the ET serves a second purpose by acting as an interference signal for EVE. Both the ET and the EHU are assumed to operate in the FD mode, hence, both nodes transmit and receive RF signals in the same frequency band and at the same time. As a result, both are subjected to self-interference, which has different consequences at the two nodes. At the ET, the self-interference hinders the decoding of the information signal received from the EHU. At the EHU, the self-interference increases the amount of energy that can be harvested by the EHU. Meanwhile, EVE is passive and only aims to intercept the confidential message transmitted by the EHU to the ET. For the considered system model, we derive an upper and a lower bound on the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, we provide a simple achievability scheme for the lower bound on the secrecy capacity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system and channel models. Sections III and IV present the upper and the lower bounds on the secrecy capacity, respectively. In Section V, we provide numerical results and we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a system model comprised of an EHU, an ET, and an EVE. In order to improve the spectral efficiency of the considered system, both the EHU and the ET are assumed to operate in the FD mode, i.e., both nodes transmit and receive RF signals simultaneously and in the same frequency band. Thereby, the EHU receives energy signals from the ET and simultaneously transmits information signals to the ET. Similarly, the ET transmits energy signals to the EHU and simultaneously receives information signals from the EHU. The signal transmitted from the ET also serves as interference to the EVE, and thereby increases its noise floor. Due to the FD mode of operation, both the EHU and the ET are subjected to self-interference, which has opposite effects at the two nodes, respectively. More precisely, the self-interference signal has a negative effect at the ET since it hinders the decoding of the information signal received from the EHU. On the other hand, at the EHU, the self-interference signal is desired since it increases the amount of energy that can be harvested by the EHU, i.e., the EHU performs energy recycling. Meanwhile, EVE remains passive and only receives, thus it is not subjected to self-interference.
A. Channel Model
Let V 12i and V 21i denote random variables (RVs) which model the fading channel gains of the EHU-ET and ET-EHU channels in channel use i, respectively. Moreover, let F i and G i denote RVs which model the fading channel gains of the EHU-EVE and ET-EVE channels in channel use i, respectively. We assume that all channel gains follow a blockfading model, i.e., they remain constant during all channel uses in one block, but change from one block to the next, where each block consists of (infinitely) many channel uses. Now, due to the FD mode of operation, the EHU-ET and the ET-EHU channels are identical and as a result the channel gains V 12i and V 21i are assumed to be identical, i.e.,
In the i-th channel use, let the transmit symbols at the EHU and the ET be modeled as RVs, denoted by X 1i and X 2i , respectively. Moreover, in channel use i, let the received symbols at the EHU, the ET, and EVE be modeled as RVs, denoted by Y 1i , Y 2i , and Y 3i , respectively. Furthermore, in channel use i, let the RVs modeling the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the EHU, the ET, and EVE be denoted by N 1i , N 2i , and N 3i , respectively, such that N 1i ⇠ N 0, 2 1 , N 2i ⇠ N 0, 2 2 , and N 3i ⇠ N 0, 3 3 , where N µ, 2 denotes a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance 2 . Moreover, let the RVs modeling the additive self-interferences at the EHU and the ET in channel use i be denoted by I 1i and I 2i , respectively. By using the notation defined above, the input-output relations describing the considered channel in channel use i can be written as
B. Self-Interference Model
We (justifiably) adopt the first order approximation of the self-interference [9] , [10] , and model I 1i and I 2i as
whereQ 1i =Q 1 (i) andQ 2i =Q 2 (i) are used for simplicity of notation. Thereby, we can write Y 1i and Y 2i as
whereq 1i andq 2i are the means ofQ 1i andQ 2i , respectively, and Q 1i and Q 2i denote the remaining zero-mean components ofQ 1i andQ 2i , respectively. Now, since the ET always knows the outcome of X 2i , x 2i , and since given sufficient time it can always estimate the deterministic component of its self-interference channel,q 2 , the ET can removeq 2 X 2i from its received symbol Y 2i , given by (7) , and thereby reduce its self-interference. In this way, the ET obtains a new received symbol, denoted again by Y 2i , as
Note that since Q 2i in (8) changes independently from one channel use to the next, the ET cannot estimate and remove Q 2i X 2i from its received symbol. Thus, Q 2i X 2i in (8) is the residual self-interference at the ET. On the other hand, since the EHU benefits from the self-interference, it does not removē q 1 X 1i from its received symbol Y 1i , given by (6) , in order to have a self-interference signal with a much higher energy. Hence, the received symbol at the EHU is given by (6) .
In this paper, we are interested in the secrecy capacity of the channel characterised by the input-output relationships given by (6), (8) , and (3).
C. Energy Harvesting Model
For the energy harvesting model, we rely on [11] , where authors prove that if the total number of channel uses satisfies n ! 1, if the battery of the EHU has an unlimited storage capacity, and if
and E{·} denotes statistical expectation, then the number of channel uses in which the extracted energy from the battery is insufficient is negligible compared to the number of channel uses in which the extracted energy is sufficient both for transmission and processing holds. In other words, when the above three conditions hold, in almost all channel uses, there will be enough energy to be extracted from the EHU's battery for both processing, P p , and for the transmission of the desired transmit symbol X 1i , X 2 1i .
III. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRECY CAPACITY
For the considered channel, we propose the following theorem which establishes an upper bound on the secrecy capacity.
Theorem 1: Assuming that the average power constraint at the ET is P ET , an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the considered channel is given by
where I(; |) denotes the conditional mutual information. In (10), lower-case letters x 2 , v, g, and f represent realizations of the random variables X 2 , V , G, and F , respectively, and their support sets are denoted by X 2 , V, G, and F, respectively. Constraint C1 in (10) constrains the average transmit power of the ET to P ET , and C2 is due to the fact that EHU has to have harvested enough energy for both processing and transmission of symbol X 1 . The maximum in the objective function is taken over all possible conditional probability distributions of x 1 and x 2 , given by p(x 1 |x 2 , v) and p(x 2 |v), respectively.
Proof: Due to the lack of space, the proof of the converse can be found in Appendix A of the extended unpublished version of this paper available on arXiv [12] .
A. Simplified Expression of the Upper Bound on the Secrecy Capacity
The optimal input distributions at the EHU and the ET that are the solutions of the optimization problem in (10) and the resulting simplified expressions of the upper bound on the secrecy capacity are provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The optimal input distribution at the EHU, found as the solution of the optimization problem in (10), is zeromean Gaussian with variance P EHU (x 2 , v), i.e., p(
where 2 is chosen such that C2 in (10) holds with equality. On the other hand, the optimal input distribution at the ET, found as the solution of the optimization problem in (10), has the following discrete form p(x 2 |v) = p(x 2 = 0) (x 2 )
where (·) denotes the Dirac delta function. The simplified expression of the upper bound on the secrecy capacity in (10) , denoted by C u s , is given by
Proof: Due to the lack of space, the proof can be found in Appendix B of the extended unpublished version of this paper available on arXiv [12] .
IV. LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRECY CAPACITY -AN ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
From Lemma 1, we can see that the upper bound on the secrecy capacity cannot be achieved since the EHU has to know x 2 2i in each channel use i, in order for the EHU to calculate (11) . In other words, the EHU can not adapt P EHU (x 2 , v) and the data rates of its codewords accordingly. If we were to set the input distribution at the ET to be binary such that x 2i , 8i, takes values from the set {x 0 , x 0 }, then the EHU can know x 2 2i in each channel use i since x 2 2i = x 2 0 , 8i, and therefore this rate can be achieved. Hence, to obtain an achievable lower bound on the secrecy capacity, we propose the ET to use the following input distribution
The value of x 0 (v) will be determined in the following.
A. Lower Bound on the Secrecy Capacity -An Achievable Secrecy Rate
The resulting achievable secrecy rate when the ET uses the distribution given in (14), is provided by the following lemma. 
Depending on the channel qualities, we have three cases for the achievable secrecy rate.
Case 1: If the following conditions
hold, where P EHU (x 2 , v) is the root of (11) for x 2 = p P ET and ⌦ V = E{v 2 }, then the input distribution at the ET has the following form
On the other hand, the input distribution at the EHU is zero-mean Gaussian with variance P EHU (
can be found as the solution of (11) for x 2 = p P ET . For Case 1, the achievable secrecy rate, denoted by C l s , is given by 
Case 2: If (16) does not hold and
holds instead, then the input distribution at the ET is given by
On the other hand, the input distribution at the EHU is zeromean Gaussian with variance P EHU (x 0 (v), v). In this case, P EHU (x 0 (v), v) and x 0 (v) are the roots of the system of equations comprised of (11) for x 2 = x 0 (v) and the following equation
For Case 2, the achievable secrecy rate is given by
Case 3: If neither (17) nor (20) hold, then the achievable secrecy rate is C l s = 0. Proof: Due to the lack of space, the proofs of Lemma 2 and the achievability scheme are omitted in this paper, however both can be found in Sections IV-A and IV-B, respectively, in the extended unpublished version of this paper available on arXiv [12] .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate examples of the upper bound on the secrecy capacity as well as of the derived achievable secrecy rate, and compare them with the achievable secrecy rates of its HD counterpart. The system parameters can be found in the extended version of the paper available on arXiv [12] .
The upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity are illustrated on Fig. 1 , and are evaluated against its HD counterpart. From Fig. 1 we notice that the FD scheme outperforms the HD scheme, which is a result of two factors. Firstly, energy recycling is impossible when the EHU operates as an HD node. Secondly, in HD, the ET stops acting like a jammer and an interference signal is not present at the EVE. Note that since physical layer security relies on the channel quality between the nodes in the network, distance plays a crucial role. To demonstrate this, we consider different cases for the distances Secrecy rates (kbps) Fig. 1 . Upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity. Fig. 1a corresponds to the case when the ET is closer to the EHU than the EVE, i.e., d EHU ET = 10m and d EHU EV E = 12m, whilst Fig. 1b corresponds to the case when the EVE is closer to the EHU than the ET, i.e., d EHU ET = 10m and d EHU EV E = 9m. Fig. 1c corresponds to the case when the EVE is closer to the EHU than the ET and d EHU ET = 20m and d EHU EV E = 18m between the nodes. In the case when the ET is closer to the EHU than the EVE, the EHU-ET channel is better, on average, than the EHU-EVE channel. For this case, the secrecy rate of the HD benchmark scheme is non-zero, but it is smaller than the derived achievable secrecy rate of the FD scheme, as it can be seen in Fig. 1a . When the EVE is closer to the EHU than the ET, the EHU-ET channel is worse, on average, than the EHU-EVE channel. In this case the secrecy rate of the HD benchmark scheme is zero, whereas the derived FD secrecy rate is positive, see Figs. 1b and 1c. Thereby, as a result of the interference signal generated by the ET, in these cases the proposed FD scheme offers positive secrecy rates even when the EVE is closer to the EHU than the legitimate receiver, which is impossible to achieve by employing the HD scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy capacity of a FD wirelessly powered communication system consisting of an EHU and an ET in the presence of a passive EVE. We have shown that the transmit signal of a FD ET can act as interference against the EVE. We have derived an upper bound on the secrecy capacity and, furthermore, an achievable secrecy rate that can be achieved with relative low complexity. It has been shown that the proposed scheme achieves significantly higher secrecy rates compared to the conventional HD-based schemes, even for practical self-interference values at the ET.
